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Impaired Decoding of Fear and Disgust Predicts Utilitarian
Moral Judgment in Alcohol-Dependent Individuals
Martina Carmona-Perera, Luke Clark, Liane Young, Miguel Perez-Garcıa
and Antonio Verdejo-Garcıa
Background: Recent studies of moral reasoning in patients with alcohol use disorders have indicated
a “utilitarian” bias, whereby patients are more likely to endorse emotionally aversive actions in favor of
aggregate welfare (e.g., throwing a dying person into the sea to keep a lifeboat of survivors afloat).
Here, we investigate the underlying psychological and neuropsychological processes.
Methods: Alcohol-dependent individuals (n = 31) and healthy comparison participants (n = 34)
completed a validated moral judgment task, as well as measures of impulsivity, mood symptoms (anxi-
ety and depression), and emotional face recognition.
Results: Alcohol-dependent individuals were more likely to endorse utilitarian choices in personal
moral dilemmas compared with controls and rated these choices as less difficult to make. Hierarchical
regression models showed that poorer decoding of fear and disgust significantly predicted utilitarian
biases in personal moral dilemmas, over and above alcohol consumption. Impulsivity and mood symp-
toms did not predict moral decisions.
Conclusions: These findings suggest that impaired fear and disgust decoding contributes to utilitar-
ian moral decision-making in alcohol-dependent individuals.
Key Words: Moral Decision-Making, Utilitarian Judgments, Alcohol-Dependent Individuals,
Emotional Face Recognition, Fear, Disgust Decoding.
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE IS characterized by thepersistent use of alcohol in the face of physical, psycho-
logical, and social consequences for oneself and close others
(American Psychiatric Association and Others, 2000). Alco-
hol-dependent individuals show deficits on decision-making
tasks due in part to their impaired ability to attach emotional
value to decision prospects (i.e., “myopia for the future”)
(Fernandez-Serrano et al., 2010; Park et al., 2010). Recent
work has targeted these decision-making deficits in the
domain of moral cognition (De Oliveira-Souza and Moll,
2009; Moran et al., 2012). Typically, participants are
instructed to choose between a utilitarian option (i.e.,
harming one person to save a greater number of people) and
a deontological option (i.e., refusing to harm someone and
thus allowing a greater number of people to die). Alcohol-
dependent individuals have been shown to endorse utilitarian
options in response to moral dilemmas (Khemiri et al.,
2012). Furthermore, among polysubstance users, severity of
alcohol use predicts the degree of utilitarian bias (Carmona-
Perera et al., 2012a,b) 2. Together, these prior studies reveal a
link between alcohol use and utilitarian moral judgment.
This link may be due to the specific neurotoxic effects of alco-
hol on frontal lobe function (Beck et al., 2012; Stephens and
Duka, 2008), associated with co-morbidities and cognitive-
affective deficits that contribute to moral judgment deficits.
The primary aim of the current study was to identify key
predictor variables of moral judgment deficits in alcohol
dependence.
Prior work has explored moral judgment deficits. For
example, studies have identified traits associated with
impaired moral cognition, including antisociality and impul-
sivity (Bartels and Pizarro, 2011; Marsh et al., 2011). Induc-
tion of negative emotional states, such as disgust, has also
been shown to reduce utilitarian bias choice in healthy indi-
viduals (Harle and Sanfey, 2010; Schnall et al., 2008; Ugazio
et al., 2012), while patients with focal damage to brain
regions that support emotional responding tend to endorse
utilitarian moral judgments to a greater extent (Koenigs
et al., 2007; Moretto et al., 2010). Moreover, depression and
anxiety levels in non-clinical samples are positively also
associated with utilitarian choice (Bartels and Pizarro, 2011;
Starcke et al., 2011; Youssef et al., 2012). Notably,
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alcohol-dependent patients exhibit depression and anxiety
(Lai et al., 2012), impulse control problems (Mitchell et al.,
2005; Stephens and Duka, 2008), poor emotion regulation,
and emotional expression recognition (Foisy et al., 2007; Ue-
kermann and Daum, 2008).
This study aimed first to replicate the prior finding that
alcohol-dependent patients show a utilitarian bias and sec-
ond to determine which psychological and neuropsychologi-
cal factors previously associated with utilitarian bias
(severity of alcohol use, impulsivity, mood symptoms, and
cognitive-affective processes) predict moral judgments in
alcohol-dependent patients. First, we hypothesized that alco-
hol-dependent individuals would deliver more utilitarian
moral judgments on personal (emotionally salient) moral
scenarios. Second, as utilitarian moral judgments of moral
personal scenarios have been previously associated with
impulsivity, altered mood states, and decoding affective defi-
cits that are closely linked to alcohol dependence problems
(Foisy et al., 2007; Lai et al., 2012; Stephens and Duka,
2008), we also hypothesized that high impulsivity, negative
mood elevations, and poor affective decoding would signifi-
cantly predict utilitarian choices in alcohol-dependent indi-
viduals. Specifically, based on our previous neural findings
linking emotional processing with moral judgment (Koenigs
et al., 2007; Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2012), we expected poor
affective decoding to be the most significant predictor of util-
itarian choices in alcohol-dependent individuals.
MATERIALS ANDMETHODS
Participants
Alcohol-dependent individuals (n = 31) and healthy control indi-
viduals (n = 34) participated in the study. The 2 groups did not dif-
fer significantly in terms of gender, age, handedness, socioeconomic
status (see Table 1). All participants were of European-Caucasian
origin. The alcohol-dependent group reported significantly fewer
years of formal education, t(63) = 5.63, p < 0.001; therefore, this
variable was entered as a covariate in all subsequent analyses.
Alcohol-dependent individuals were recruited from the detoxifi-
cation unit of Nostra Senyora deMeritxell Hospital between October
2010 and June 2011. All subjects met DSM-IV criteria for alcohol
dependence and did not meet criteria for abuse or dependence of
other substances, with the exception of nicotine. For eligibility, par-
ticipants needed to have been abstinent for at least 15 days (mean
2.56 month, SD = 3.44), as confirmed by urine analyses performed
approximately every 3 days, and not have comorbid diagnoses of
Axis I or Axis II disorders, assessed by clinical reports. Controls were
recruited from the community through word-of-mouth communica-
tion. The main criterion for inclusion in the control group was the
absence of significant alcohol use patterns, defined as fewer than 10
standard units of alcohol per week, taking a glass of whisky or other
liquor to equal one unit, and a glass of wine or beer to equal 0.5 units.
All participants scored at least 27 (i.e., normal cognitive state base-
line) on the Spanish version of the Mini mental state examination
(MEC; Lobo et al., 1979).
Instruments
1. Interview for Research on Addictive Behavior, IRAB (Verdejo-
Garcıa et al., 2005). This instrument evaluates the average
amount of alcohol consumption per month and the duration of
use in years. A combined quantity x duration variable was calcu-
lated for total alcohol consumption (i.e., alcohol units over life-
time) to illustrate group differences in alcohol exposure, despite
the relative similarity in duration of alcohol use.
2. Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, BIS-11 (Patton et al., 1995); Spanish
version (Oquendo et al., 2001). This scale was used as a measure
of impulsive personality traits. Participants were asked to rate a
set of impulsivity manifestations on frequency: never or rarely,
occasionally, often and always or almost always (scoring from
0 to 4). The main dependent variable was the total impulsivity
score, and 3 subscale scores: cognitive, motor, and non-planning
impulsiveness.
3. Hamilton Depression and Anxiety Rating Scales (Hamilton, 1960,
1969); Spanish version (Ramos-Brieva and Cordero Villafafila,
1986). These scales assess depression and anxiety symptoms. The
interviewer assigns a score between 0 and 4, depending on fre-
quency and intensity of symptoms (maximum depression and
anxiety scores are 52 and 56, respectively). In addition, the anxi-
ety scale can assess psychic and somatic anxiety separately. We
used depression and anxiety total scores and anxiety partial
scores (psychic and somatic) as dependent variables.
4. Facial Expressions of Emotion: Stimuli and Tests, FEEST
(Young et al., 2002). This cognitive-affective decoding task
assesses recognition of facial emotional expressions. Participants
must identify which emotion (anger, disgust, fear, happiness,
sadness, and surprise) best describes the facial expression dis-
played. A set of 60 faces was presented, in random order, for
5 seconds each; there was no time limit for responding. The num-
ber of correct identifications for each emotion (ranging from 0 to
10) was collected as a dependent measure.
5. Moral Judgment task (Greene et al., 2001). We used 32 hypothet-
ical dilemmas selected in a prior work through Rasch analysis
(Carmona-Perera et al., 2012a). The Spanish version was derived
Table 1. Descriptive Scores for the Sociodemographic and Alcohol use






















Right-handed 87.1% 88.2% 1.42b 0.889
Left-handed 12.9% 11.8%
Socioeconomic level


























aValue of Student’s t-test.
bValue of chi-squared test.
Socioeconomic status was collected from clinical history reported by
clinical staff.

























































through back-translation, and its psychometric properties were
adequate in an independent community sample (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.78, Spearman Brown coefficient = 0.76; (Carmona-
Perera et al., 2012a). Participants chose if they would perform
(“yes”) or refuse to perform (“no”) an action to resolve each
moral dilemma. Participants also rated the subjective difficulty of
the decision using a Likert scale ranging from 1 (very low) to 10
(extreme). For moral dilemmas, affirmative answers (“yes”) were
considered “utilitarian”. Dilemmas were classified into 3 types:
nonmoral dilemmas in a control condition (involving a cost-
benefit decision without moral or emotional content; n = 8),
moral impersonal (involving a moral decision of low emotional
salience; n = 8), and moral personal (moral decisions of high
emotional salience; n = 16). Personal dilemmas were further
classified as low conflict (shorter response latencies and high
intersubject agreement) versus high conflict (longer responses
latencies and low intersubject agreement) (Koenigs et al., 2007).
The dependent variables were the proportion of affirmative
choices, the difficulty rating, and the decision latencies, for each
of the dilemma categories.
Procedure
Participants provided written informed consent, before complet-
ing 2 individual test sessions lasting 1 hour each. In the first session,
we administered the assessments of drug use, impulsivity, mood,
and emotional decoding. In the second session, we administered the
moral judgment task, in a computerized format. Individual dilem-
mas were presented over 3 phases on successive screens: The first
screen described the scenario; the second screen prompted the
response; the third screen prompted the difficulty rating on a Likert
scale (with no time limits imposed).
Data Analyses
Performance differences on the moral judgment task were com-
pared between groups using a series of 2 (Group) 9 4 (Type of
dilemma) mixed-model ANCOVAs, with years of education entered
as a covariate, on the 3 dependent measures (affirmative choices, dif-
ficulty ratings, and decision latencies). Significant Group 9 Type of
dilemma interactions were decomposed using t-tests on each of the
4 dilemma categories. Additional analyses were conducted to deter-
mine the influence of education, by comparing 2 subsets (n = 20)
matched on education. Group differences in emotion recognition,
impulsivity, depression, and anxiety were tested using univariate
ANCOVAs (with years of education entered as a covariate).
To analyze the predictive capacity of the different psychological
variables on utilitarian moral judgments, hierarchical multiple
regression analyses were performed. The hierarchical regression
approach was chosen to estimate the relative increase in the percent-
age of explained variance (and the statistical significance of the pre-
diction change) provided by each of the consecutive sets of
predictors. The 4 sets of predictors were entered in reverse sequence
relative to our hypothesis: Affective decoding measures were
included last. Therefore, the affective decoding set had to increase
the percentage of variance explained by the other predictors to
attain significant. We included the dependent measures from the
moral judgment task that showed significant group differences: pro-
portion of affirmative (utilitarian) judgments for high-conflict dilem-
mas, proportion of affirmative (utilitarian) choices for low-conflict
dilemmas, and self-reported difficulty assessments for high-conflict
dilemmas. The predictor variables were the sociodemographic and
psychological variables that elicited significant group differences,
which were grouped on 5 theoretically driven sets and introduced in
this order: (i) years of education, (ii) total alcohol consumption
(composite estimate of amount and duration of alcohol use),
(iii) impulsivity (BIS-impulsivity total score), (iv) mood (combined
Hamilton depression and anxiety score), (v) emotional decoding
(number of hits in the decoding of facial expressions of fear and dis-
gust). To determine the differential contribution of each set of pre-
dictors, we estimated the R2 change associated with the entrance of
each new set and its statistical significance.
RESULTS
Group Differences
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics and between-group
comparisons for the psychological variables. The alcohol-
dependent group showed significantly higher levels of impul-
sivity, depression, and anxiety, and significantly poorer
recognition of fear and disgust compared with control partic-
ipants, controlling for the effect of education. We found no
significant differences in the perception of expressions of sad-
ness, happiness, surprise, and anger. Cohen’s d coefficients
for the group differences exceeded 1, indicating large effect
sizes (Zakzanis, 2001).
On the moral dilemmas task, a significant Group (Alco-
hol-dependent individuals vs. Healthy controls) 9 Category
of dilemma interaction was observed for affirmative (utilitar-
ian) answers, F(3, 186) = 10.32, p < 0.001. The main effects
for Group, F(1, 62) = 6.26, p = 0.015, and Dilemma cate-
gory, F(3, 186) = 11.37, p < 0.001, were also significant. The
alcohol-dependent group was more likely to endorse utilitar-
ian options for low-conflict personal dilemmas,
t(63) = 5.23, p < 0.001, and high-conflict personal dilem-
mas, t(63) = 4.35, p < 0.001. No significant differences
Table 2. Descriptive Scores, Univariate Analyses of Covariance
(ANCOVAs), and Effect Sizes on the Psychological Variables for Alcohol-

















Cognitive 15.77 (4.58) 11.35 (4.14) 9.84 0.003* 1.02
Motor 17.87 (7.69) 8.09 (3.99) 27.07 0.000* 1.62
Nonplanning 18.03 (7.41) 9.59 (5.88) 19.22 0.000* 1.27
Depression 12.32 (8.88) 2.12 (2.32) 27.68 0.000* 1.61
Anxiety (total) 15.32 (12.46) 3.56 (3.95) 18.86 0.000* 1.30
Somatic 6.71 (5.76) 1.62 (2.26) 13.69 0.000* 1.19




43.13 (5.69) 50.03 (5.52) 11.85 0.001* 1.23
Anger 7.09 (1.99) 8.18 (1.59) 2.17 0.146 0.60
Disgust 6.58 (1.84) 8.62 (1.58) 9.69 0.003* 1.19
Fear 4.32 (2.21) 6.65 (2.39) 10.30 0.002* 1.01
Happiness 9.71 (0.46) 9.85 (0.44) 1.19 0.280 0.32
Sadness 7.35 (2.27) 7.53 (1.79) 0.01 0.910 0.09
Surprise 8.52 (1.52) 9.18 (1.34) 1.61 0.210 0.46
*p-value <0.05.
For the emotional perception task, we obtained the number of correct
identifications for each emotion (ranging 0 to 10), and the sum score of
total correct identifications (ranging 0 to 60).

























































were observed on the nonmoral scenarios, t(63) = 1.95,
p = 0.064, or impersonal dilemmas, t(63) = 0.08, p = 0.936
(Fig. 1).
A significant Group 9 Category interaction also emerged
for the difficulty ratings, F(3, 186) = 6.56, p = 0.003, such
that the alcohol-dependent group reported lower difficulty
on the high-conflict dilemmas, t(63) = 3.07, p = 0.003, but
not the other 3 categories (nonmoral, p = 0.467; impersonal,
p = 0.163; low-conflict, p = 0.565). No significant main effects
were found for Group, F(1, 62) = 2.01, p = 0.162, or
Dilemma category, F(3, 186) = 1.79, p = 0.150.
In addition, no significant Group 9 Category interaction
was observed for decision latencies, F(3, 186) = 0.55,
p = 0.648. The main effects for Group and Category were
also nonsignificant (p > 0.05).
Additional analysis was conducted to further examine the
influence of education. We selected subgroups from the alco-
hol-dependent group and healthy control group, which did
not differ on years of education (AD subgroup, n = 20,
mean = 14.84, SD = 1.80; HC subgroup n = 20,
mean = 15.30, SD = 2.08), t(37) = 0.73; p = 0.468. These
matched subgroups nevertheless showed significant differ-
ences in utilitarian responding for personal moral dilemmas,
low conflict, t(37) = 3.24, p = 0.003; high conflict,
t(37) = 2.89, p = 0.006. These groups also differed on diffi-
culty ratings for high-conflict dilemmas, t(37) = 2.47,
p = 0.018. We found no significant differences between sub-
groups on the other 3 categories (all p > 0.05).
Moral Decision-Making Predictors
The regression model for utilitarian choices for high-
conflict personal dilemmas showed significant effects of the
first and second blocks that entered the education and total
alcohol consumption variables. Impulsivity and mood vari-
ables did not significantly improve the prediction level. How-
ever, inclusion of the emotional decoding block, including
fear and disgust recognition, did significantly add to the
model (see Table 3 for regression values). The global model
predicted 23.8% of total variance and the best individual pre-
dictor was the fear recognition score, which was inversely
correlated with utilitarian choices (b = 0.311, p = 0.018).
For utilitarian choices on low-conflict personal dilemmas,
the blocks of education and total alcohol consumption were
significant predictors of utilitarian choices. Impulsivity and
mood variables were not significant predictors. Entering the
block of emotional decoding variables again significantly
increased the predictive value, with 27.7% of total variance
explained in the global model. Total alcohol consumption
(b = 0.354, p = 0.026) and disgust recognition (b = 0.252,
p = 0.072) were the variables that were individually signifi-
cant predictors. Total alcohol consumption was positively
correlated with utilitarian choices, while disgust recognition
correlation was inversed. For difficulty ratings on the high-
conflict personal dilemmas, none of the blocks was signifi-
cantly predictive.
DISCUSSION
This study aimed both to replicate prior work revealing
utilitarian bias in alcohol-dependent individuals and to deter-
mine the predictors of this bias, for example severity of alco-
hol use, impulsivity, mood symptoms, and emotional
decoding. Our findings demonstrate a utilitarian bias on per-
sonal moral scenarios in individuals with alcohol depen-
dence. In addition, alcohol-dependent individuals rated these
decisions as less difficult, compared with controls. Critically,
poor recognition of facial expressions of fear and disgust pre-
dicted utilitarian bias on personal moral dilemmas, over and
above the impact of total alcohol consumption and years of
education. Specifically, impaired fear decoding emerged as
the main predictor of utilitarian choices for high-conflict
dilemmas, whereas impaired disgust decoding emerged as the
main predictor of utilitarian choices for low-conflict dilem-
mas. Although future work is required to explore these
effects, we suggest that the perception of fear in specific indi-
viduals may lead to an aversion to harming those individuals
even when doing so may lead to saving other people, as in
high-conflict scenarios (Crockett et al., 2010). On the other
hand, low-conflict scenarios (e.g., causing harm for selfish
benefit) may trigger moral disgust (Ugazio et al., 2012;
Wheatley and Haidt, 2005).
Notably, impulsivity and mood symptoms were not signif-
icant predictors of moral decision-making, although they dif-
fered significantly between groups. Nevertheless, future workFig. 1.7 Proportion of affirmative answers and difficulty of judgment








































































should use neuropsychological measures of impulse control
or biological markers of affective disturbance such as sali-
vary cortisol (Dallman, 2005).
The current demonstration of utilitarian responding in
alcohol-dependent individuals is consistent with prior work,
including a previous study in a Swedish sample (Khemiri
et al., 2012). The utilitarian bias observed in the current sam-
ple also appears to be broader than the pattern observed in
our prior work in a polysubstance-dependent group (Carmo-
na-Perera et al., 2012a,b), in which the bias emerged only
high-conflict personal dilemmas. In the current sample, utili-
tarian bias extended to low-conflict personal dilemmas,
which elicit deontological judgments in healthy subjects and
even patients with impaired emotional processing (Koenigs
et al., 2007; Moretto et al., 2010). Thus, the current sample
of alcohol-dependent individuals appears to show relatively
severe cognitive-affective deficits (Foisy et al., 2007; Stephens
and Duka, 2008; Uekermann and Daum, 2008).
These findings are also consistent with prior evidence
showing that alcohol-dependent individuals are impaired in
their decoding of fear and disgust (Foisy et al., 2007; Ueker-
mann and Daum, 2008). In the current study, these decoding
deficits emerged as the key predictors of utilitarian choice on
a subset of moral dilemmas. Poor emotional decoding is typi-
cally associated with deficits in aversive conditioning (Borlik-
ova et al., 2006; Stephens and Duka, 2008) and may render
alcohol-dependent individuals less sensitive to the emotional
consequences (e.g., causing personal harm) of utilitarian
responding (Birbaumer et al., 2005; Gao et al., 2010).
Indeed, individuals with difficulty identifying fear-inducing
behaviors tend to judge these behaviors as more morally
acceptable (Marsh and Cardinale, 2012). More generally,
interpersonal interactions are based in large part on our abil-
ity to perceive other emotions (Riggio et al., 2003); thus,
emotional decoding deficits in alcohol dependence may lead
to social impairments observed in this population (Kornreich
et al., 2002; Maurage et al., 2008).
The present research can be understood in the context of
dual-process models of moral judgment; alcohol-dependent
individuals show reduced ability to integrate social-
emotional inputs and therefore endorse utilitarian moral
judgments (Greene, 2007). As such, the current results are
also consistent with the proposed role of emotion in deonto-
logical judgments (Schnall et al., 2008; Van Dillen et al.,
2012; Wheatley and Haidt, 2005). More specifically, the suc-
cessful induction of avoidance-related emotions (e.g., disgust
or fear) may lead to deontological moral judgments (Harle
and Sanfey, 2010; Ugazio et al., 2012). Furthermore, accord-
ing to the somatic-marker theory of addiction, the medial
prefrontal cortex is the key brain region for generating and
integrating emotional signals (somatic-markers), which arise
in anticipation of the affective and social consequences of dif-
ferent courses of action (e.g., utilitarian vs. deontological),
crucially guiding decision-making (Verdejo-Garcıa and
Bechara, 2009).
We should acknowledge that our 2 groups were not clo-
sely matched for background education. We therefore
included this variable as a covariate in our analyses;
although, given some of the caveats raised about the use of
ANCOVA (Grove and Meehl, 1996; Waller et al., 2006),
we also note that our group effects were substantiated both
in the ANOVA models without the covariate term included
and in the sensitivity analysis using subsets matched for
education. Our regression models also directly investigated
any influence of education, with the psychological variables
entered after education. We think that the correlation with
alcohol consumption reflects a consequence of alcoholism,
but other explanations are possible, and future work should
explore alternative premorbid factors including, especially,
psychopathic traits (Bartels and Pizarro, 2011; Harenski
et al., 2009) or altered attentional control (Van Dillen
et al., 2012), which may also partially account for these
findings. In sum, our study not only replicates the associa-
tion between alcohol dependence and utilitarian moral
judgment but also reveals that defective fear and disgust
decoding are key predictors of utilitarian choices in
personal moral dilemmas. These findings have important
clinical implications, given that poor decision-making is a
well-validated predictor of alcohol and drug relapse (Allsop
et al., 2000; Bechara and Damasio, 2002). Furthermore, the
impairments in fear and disgust recognition could be
related to clinical observations in alcohol-dependent indi-
viduals, such as the lack of disgust of vomit, and poor per-
sonal hygiene (Hazelton et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2008).
Table 3. Multiple Hierarchical Regression Models of the Association of Education, Total Alcohol Consumption, Impulsivity, Mood, and Emotional





















Variable 1 0.119 (0.005)* 0.075 (0.020)* 0.005 (0.551) 0.018 (0.655) 0.107 (0.017)* 0.238 (0.002)* Fear Rec (0.018)*
Variable 2 0.122 (0.005)* 0.143 (0.001)* 0.000 (0.941) 0.015 (0.543) 0.077 (0.042)* 0.277 (0.001)* Tot Alcohol (0.021)*
Disgust Rec (0.072)
Variable 3 0.044 (0.096) 0.006 (0.554) 0.000 (0.993) 0.033 (0.354) 0.013 (0.677) 0.017 (0.554)
*p-value <0.05.
Variable 1: Proportion of utilitarian choices in high-conflict personal dilemmas; Variable 2: Proportion of utilitarian choices in low-conflict personal dilem-
mas; Variable 3: Mean of judgment difficulty in high-conflict personal dilemmas; Tot Alcohol, Total Alcohol Consumption; EmDecod, Emotional Decoding;
Fear Rec, Fear Recognition; Disgust Rec, Disgust Recognition.

























































Specific interventions directed at improving emotional
decoding as well as transferring these emotional capacities
into real-life decisions, for example the Micro Expression
Training Tool (Ekman, 2003; Matsumoto and Hwang,
2009), and Multimodal Affective Systems (Duric et al.,
2002; Lisetti and Nasoz, 2002; Zeng et al., 2009) may prove
useful.
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